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THE TAXATION OF FAMILY INCOME
PAUL W. BRUTON*
CONFRONTED with rising taxes and falling profits taxpayers are
resorting to every method at their disposal to minimize their
mounting tax burdens. The artificial distribution of large in-
comes among several persons is one of the obvious means of tax
avoidance. The courts are thus confronted with an increasing
number of cases involving various devices designed to accomplish
this result. Roughly, these cases fall into two general groups-
those involving the community property system as a means of
dividing income between husband and wife, and those dealing
with different kinds of agreements whereby the taxpayer assigns
his income. Of course, any question of the taxation of community
income arises only between husband and wife. Examination re-
veals, however, that practically all of the assignment cases like-
wise deal with the distribution of income among members of a
family.
I. Taxation of Community Income
The Revenue Act provides that "There shall be levied, collected,
and paid for each taxable year upon the net income of every
individual a normal tax equal to" a sum specified in the statute.1
There is no indication as to what shall constitute income of the
particular individual taxed, whether it shall be the income to
which, according to the courts, he has "legal title," or "equitable
title," or simply income which he actually enjoys through his
power to dispose of as he pleases. It is safe to say that this mat-
ter was never considered by the legislators, but was left to the
Treasury officials and the courts to work out as particular cases
arose.
The problem was presented first in the community property
states,2 where it was contended that the wife had an interest in
community income which was equal to that of the husband and
that therefore one-half of such income should be returned by
each spouse. In no two states are the community property stat-
utes just alike, but in general it may be said that community
* Instructor in the Yale School of Law; author of The Requirement of De-
livery as Applied to Gifts of Choses in Action (1930) 39 YAL L. J. 837.
'Revenue Act of 1928, § 11. The wording has been the same since the
1918 act.
2 The states are: Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, Now
Mexico, Texas and Washington.
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income consists of the earnings of the husband and of the wife
and the income from any investment of such earnings.' In some
states the income from separate property is included. Commun-
ity property is under the management and control of the husband.
Thus he has complete power over the disposition of com-
munity personal property, subject only to the restrictions that
he may not will more than one-half of it and cannot make certain
gifts of it without his wife's consent.4 Therefore, whether the
income of the husband and the profits from it be regarded as
community income or as his separate income makes little differ-
ence as far as the power of the husband to control and enjoy it
is concerned. It was argued, however, by the taxpayers in the
community property states that the Revenue Act taxed income to
the person who "owned" it and that the wife, having a "vested
interest" in community income, "owned" one-half of it and
therefore should be taxed for one-half. This "vested interest'
argument was based upon the common law theory of ownership
embodied in the conception of legal title. It was a theory which
was inept and inadequate to describe community property rela-
tions which were developed under an alien jurisprudence. It
had no real connection with the tax problem involved which
should have been approached from the standpoint of the tax-
payer's actual relation to the income for which he was taxed.
No one outside the Treasury Department passed on the ques-
tion until 1920 and 1921 when the Treasury obtained opinions
from Attorney-General Palmer to the effect that spouses in all of
the community property states except California could each re-
turn one-half of the community income.5 How completely the
Attorney-General accepted the "vested interest" theory is indi-
cated by his reason for excluding California from the list of
favored states. The rights and powers of the wife were the same
in California as in some of the other community property states0
3 Unless, of course, the spouses agree otherwise.
4 For a comparative study of community property systems see Daggett,
The Modern Problem of the Nature of thc Wife's Intcrest in Commupity
Property-A Conparative Study (1931) 19 CAL. L. REv. 567.
5 The first opinion considered only Texas. 32 Op. Att'y Gen. 298 (1920).
The second opinion dealt with the problem in the other community states.
32 Op. Att'y Gen. 435 (1921).
6 This can be illustrated by comparing the part of the Attorney-General's
opinion relating to Nevada with that concerning California. It was stated
that in each of these states the husband had the control and management
of the community property, subject to certain qualifications not regarded
as important nor even mentioned; that in each state, upon the death of the
wife the entire community property belonged, without administration, to
the surviving husband; and that upon the death of the husband one-half
of the property went to the surviying spouse, while the other half 'was
subject to the testamentary disposition of the husband. The only difference
between the laws of the two states which was mentioned in the opinion 'was
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but the California courts had described the wife's interest in
community property as an "expectancy" rather than as a "vested
interest." Upon this basis the Attorney-General concluded that
in California the husband should be taxed for all of the com-
munity income. Unfortunately for the California taxpayers, the
state courts had applied the wrong label.
Thus the matter stood until 1924, when Attorney-General
Stone advised the Treasury Department to resort to litigation in
order to determine what rule should govern the taxation of com-
munity income in CaliforniaT The test case of Robbins v. United
States was then prepared. The district court held that the Treas-
ury officials had acted erroneously in taxing Mr. Robbins for all
of the community income accruing to him and his wife." It so
decided, not on the theory that the wife's interest was "vested,"
which it regarded as an unimportant matter of form, but on the
ground that the California statutes defining the husband's powers
of control over community property were substantially the same
as those in the other c9mmunity property states. Since commu-
nity income ,was divided in those states it should also be divided
in California.
But the California taxpayers were doomed to disappointment,
for the decision was reversed by the United States Supreme
Court.9 Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, agreed with
the judge below that the decision should rest, not upon whether
the wife's interest in community property was characterized as
"vested" or "expectant," but upon the husband's control over the
community income. He reached the conclusion that the hus-
band's powers of management and control should render him
liable for the tax since they were so extensive as to enable him
practically to dispose of it as he would his separate income. He
said:
"Although restricted in the matter of gifts, etc., he alone has
the disposition of the fund. He may spend it substantially as he
chooses, and if he wastes it in debauchery the wife has no re-
dress. His liability for his wife's support comes from a different
source and exists whether there is community property or not.
That he may be taxed for such a fund seems to us to need no
that in Nevada the courts had called the wife's interest "vested" and had
held that no inheritance tax was due upon the one-half of the community
property which went to her upon her husband's death: In re Williams, 40
Nev. 241, 161 Pac. 741 (1916); while in California the wife's interest had
been described as an "expectancy" and it had been held that an inheritanco
tax was due in the above situation. In re Moffitt's Estate, 153 Cal. 359,
95 Pac. 653 (1908), rehearing denied, 95 Pac. 1025 (1908).
734 Op. Att'y Gen. 395 (1924).
85 F. (2d) 690 (N. D. Cal. 1925).
9 United States v. Robbins, 269 U. S. 315, 46 Sup. Ct. 148 (1926). For
a good discussion of the Robbins case see Maggs, Community Property and
the Federal Income Tax (1926) 14 CAL. L. REV. 351, 441.
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argument. The same and further considerations lead to the con-
clusion that it was intended to tax him for the whole. For not
only should he who has all the power bear the burden, and not
only is the husband the most obvious target for the shaft, but the
fund taxed, while liable to be taken for his debts, is not liable to
be taken for the wife's, so that the remedy for her failure to pay
might be hard to find." 1 0
The expression of this view by the court left the tax situation
more uncertain than ever. The Treasury had proceeded upon
the theory that the division of community income depended upon
whether the wife had what the courts called a "vested interest."
But if it depended upon the actual control the husband exercised
over the income there was little reason for not taxing the hus-
band for all of the community income in everyone of the com-
munity property states, since as pointed out by the lower court,
the husband's powers were substantially the same in all the
states. In order that the whole question might be litigated the
opinions of Attorney-General Palmer 11 were withdrawn and new
test cases were begun in several of the interested states.
In the meantime, the California taxpayers, having resolved to
do all in their power to make possible a division of community
income, turned to the legislature for assistance and in 1927 there
was added to the California Civil Code a provision reading: "The
respective interests of the husband and wife in community prop-
erty during continuance of the marriage relations are present,
existing and equal interests under the management and control
of the husband as is provided in sections 172 and 172 A of the
Civil Code. This section shall be construed as defining the respec-
tive interests and rights of husband and wife in community prop-
erty." - This provision did not change in the slightest degree the
rights or powers of either spouse, but tax liability under the
theory upon which the Treasury had proceeded prior to the
Robbins case depended, not upon the actual rights of husband
and wife in community property, but upon the name which was
given the wife's interest, and that interest was now re-baptized
and emerged with the blessing of the legislature as "present,
existing and equal" with that of the husband. No longer could
it be referred to as a "mere expectancy."
This was the setting in which the test cases came on for hear-
ing in the Supreme Court. The first to be decided was Poe v.
1o Supra note 8, at 326.
1135 Op. Att'y Gen. 265 (1927). The opinion of March 8, 1924, reaffirmed
by opinion of October 9, 1924, relating to the estate tax was also with-
drawn. 35 Op. Att'y Gen. 89 (1926).




Seabor 13 which came up from the State of Washington. The
income involved consisted -f Mr. Seaborn's salary and profits
from community property. Taking its cue from the reasoning
in the Robbins case, the government contended that the broad
powers of the husband over community property should render
him liable for taxation on all of the community income. This
result, it was urged, would accomplish a uniform operation of the
income tax throughout all the states in the union by preventing
preferred treatment of taxpayers in the community property
states. Speaking through Mr. Justice Roberts, the Court replied
to this argument as follows: "While the husband has the man-
agement and control of community personal property and lke
power of disposition thereof as of his separate personal prop-
erty,1 this power is subject to restrictions which are inconsistent
with denial of the wife's interest as co-owner." 11 The restrictions
which the court enumerated may be summarized as follows:
1. The wife may borrow for community purposes and bind
the community property.
2. Since the husband may not discharge his separate obliga-
tions out of community property the wife may enjoin the collec-
tion of the husband's separate debts out of the community
property.
3.The community property is not liable for the husband's torts
not committed in carrying on the business of the community.
Upon examination it will be found that none of these so-called
restrictions involve any limitation upon the husband's use and
disposition of community income to which husbands in the non-
community property states would not be subject. The fact that
the wife may be able to bind the community property for debts
contracted for family purposes cannot be regarded as a serious
limitation on the husband's use of his income, existing only under
community property systems, when it is remembered that in all
states the husband is liable for the support of his family. The
second proposition seems to contain the most serious limitation
but it appears to be a misstatement of the law. The husband has
full power to contract separate debts and contrary to the Court's
statement he may pay them out of community income.' There-
fore, the fact that community property is not liable to be seized
13282 U. S. 101, 51 Sup. Ct. 58 (1930).
14 Italics added.
15Supra note 12, at 110.
10 "The husband shall have the management and control of community
personal property, with a like power of disposition as he has of his separate
personal property, except he shall shall not devise by will more than one-
half thereof." WAsH. .Coip. STAT. (Remington, 1922) § 6892. The case
relied upon by the court for its statement is Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Clark,
144 Wash. 520, 258 Pac. 35 (1927), in which it was held that community
property was not liable for a debt arising out of a tort of the husband.
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for his separate debts 17 is a protection to him rather than a limi-
tation upon his control over community income. The same may
be said of the proposition that community property is not liable
for certain of the husband's torts. Clearly then, the husband has
all the power; but he bears only half the burden, because "the
wife has, in Washington, a vested property right IS in the com-
munity property equal with that of her husband, and in the in-
come of the community, including salaries or wages of either
husband or wife or both." - This can be regarded only as a
return to the "vested interest" theory which had been accepted
originally by the Treasury Department. Thus if the Robbins
case 20 offered any hope that the Court would work its way out of
the community property tangle by rejecting inapplicable theories
of title, that hope was destroyed by the opinion in Poe v. Sea-
born.m2
Since the Seaborn case was decided on the basis of the label
applied to the wife's interest, it was to be expected that the 1927
amendment to the California law would accomplish its purpose.
The California tax-payers achieved their goal in United States v.
Malcolm when the Court held that a husband residing in Cali-
fornia should be taxed for only one-half of the community in-
come 23 earned in 1928. The interests of the husband and wife
were such as to bring the case within the rule of Poe v. Seaborn
because of the amendment changing the definition of the wife's
interest.2 4 The other community property cases 25 were decided
171In McKAY, CommuNrry PROPERTY (2d ed. 1925) § 793, it is stated that
this limitation is peculiar to the State of Washington and does not exist in
the other community property states.
Is Italics added.
3-9 Supra note 13, at 111.
2o Supra note 9.
21 Referring to United States v. Robbins, the Court said: "In the Robbins
case we found that the law of California, as construed by her own courts,
gave the wife a mere expectancy and that the property rights of the hus-
band during the life of the community were so complete that he was in
fact the owner." Supra note 13, at 116. No mention is made of any "prop-
erty rights" possessed by Mr. Robbins which did not also belong to Mr.
Seaborn.
22 282 U. S. 792, 51 Sup. Ct. 184 (1931).
23 The income consisted of the husband's salary.
24 The California law was changed in 1917 and in 1923, but the amend-
ment of 1927 was the only one mentioned in the opinion. The Board of Tax
Appeals has held that the amendments of 1917 and 1923 did not give the
wife a "vested interest" in community property although the later amend-
ment gave her the power to will one-half of the property. Therefore the
Board sustained the Commissioner in taxing the husband for all of the
community income earned in the years 1923-1924. Preston v. Commissioner,
21 B. T. A. 840 (1930). The decision in Cerruti v. Commissioner, 4 B. T. A.
682 (1926), is in accord as to the 1917 changes which provided in sub-
stance: (1) that in a suit for separate maintenance where no divorce
is granted and the marriage status continued, the court may make the same
19321 1177
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in conformity with Poe v. Seabomn and now spouses in all of the
community property states may divide community income be-
tween them.
The result is an inequitable distribution of the tax burden for
the tax imposed upon family incomes in the community property
states is much lighter than that which must be borne by families
in other parts of the country. It was argued in Poe v. Seaborn
that all of the community income should be taxed to the husband
in order to accomplish a uniform operation of the tax. Mr. Jus-
tice Roberts attempted to meet this point by saying:
"This argument cuts both ways. When it is remembered that a
wife's earnings are a part of the community property equally
with her husband's, it may well seem to those who live in states
where a wife's earnings are her own, that it would not tend to
promote uniformity to tax the husband on her earhings as part
of his income. The answer to such argument, however, is that
the constitutional requirement of uniformity is not intrinsic, but
geographic. And differences of state law, which may bring a
person within or without the category designated by Congress as
taxable, may not be read into the Revenue Act to spell out a
lack of uniformity." 2e
This reasoning does not justify the result which the Court
reached. In the first place, the Justice assumed that the
only alternative to dividing community income equally be-
tween husband and wife was to tax the husband for all of it,
including the wife's earnings; whereas the court could very well
have held that salary should be taxed to the spouse who earned
it and that other community income should be taxed to the hus-
band who controlled it. This result would have accomplished sub-
stantial uniformity among all the states, and there was ample
authority upon which such a decision could have been rested.21
disposition of community property that it could if the marriage wre dis-
solved; (2) that the husband cannot sell, encumber or lease the community
r~alty for a period of over one year without the joinder of the wfo; and
(3) that upon the death of the husband no inheritance tax shall be assessed
on the wife's one-half of the community property.
25 Arizona: Goodell v. Koch, 282 U. S. 118, 51 Sup. Ct. 62 (1930) ; Louis-
iana: Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U. S. 127, 51 Sup. Ct. 64 (1930); Texas:
Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U. S. 122, 51 Sup. Ct. 62 (1930).
Supra, note 13, at 117.
The salary could have been taxed to the spouse earning it on the
authority of Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 111, 50 Sup. Ct. 241 (1930), and
other community income could have been taxed to the husband on the
authority of United States v. Robbins, supra note 9. In Randall v. Com-
missioner, 4 B. T. A. 679 (1926) the Board held that the earnings of the
wife should be taxed to her ort, the theory that the Robbins case did not
pass on the question of the taxation of the wife's earnings. See Cruiek-
shank v. Commissioner, 13 B. T. A. 508 .(1928). The Commissioner does
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Secondly, the constitutional requirement of uniformity was not
involved. The question was not whether some provision of the
Constitution had been violated, but which of several interpreta-
tions should be placed upon the taxing act and in deciding this
issue the court certainly might have looked to the operation of
the tax. Estimates based directly on community property returns
indicate that the taxes levied on community incomes in 1928 were
from 30% to 32% lighter than they would have been if a division
of community income had not been permitted. These figures
show that there is in fact a discrimination against families re-
siding in the non-community property states.20 The only remedy
for this unsatisfactory situation o appears to lie in action by
Congress.
II. Tamcati~n of Assigned Itco2ie
During the years in which community income was taxable to the
husband in California, spouses living in that state resorted to
various kinds of agreements for the purpose of accomplishing a
division of their income which they had thus far failed to achieve
under the provisions of the community property statutes.32 In
not acquiesce in the Randall decision. INT. REV. CUBr. BULL. (1931) X-1,
at 24.
28 See Labovitz, The Community Property System (1931) 9 TAx MA .
286, 291.29 In considering these figures it must be remembered that the sum which
it is here estimated would be collected from the taxation of the community
as a unit would result in part from the inclusion of the wife's earnings in
community property. But this should not materially affect the figures since
the earnings of the wife are a comparatively unimportant item in com-
munity income, particularly in the higher brackets where the division of
income would have the greatest effect on the rates.
so Another objection to the result reached in the test cases is the burden
it places upon the federal courts. Attempts are constantly made to return
separate income as community income in order that it may be divided, and
frequently it is difficult to ascertain whether particular items of income
should be classified as separate or community. In order to determine the
question, the courts must have evidence which is sometimes difficult to
secure, and they are required to pass upon close questions of state law
which may or may not have been decided by the state courts. See Lucas
v. Baucum, 50 F. (2d) 806 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931); Merren v. Commissioner,
51 F. (2d) 44 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931).
31 Consideration of assignments of income from a corporation to its stock-
holders is outside the scope of this article. On this question see Renselaer
& S. R. Co. v. Irwin, 249 Fed. 726 (C. C. A.'2d, 1913); Eddy's Steam
Bakery v. Rasmusson, 47 F. (2d) 247 (D. C. Mont. 1931); Central Life
Assur. Soc. v. Commissioner, 51 F. (2d) 939 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931); Note
(1931) 41 YALn L. J. 130.
- The Supreme Court of California has held that whatever effect the
1927 amendment may have on property acquired after its effective date,
it cannot in any manner relate to or govern the "ownership" of property
acquired prior thereto. Stewart v. Stewart, 204 Cal. 546, 269 Pac. 439
(1928). In view of this decision it seems likely that income from commu-
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the first cases which arose the courts defeated these attempts at
tax reduction by holding that the particular agreements in ques-
tion did not, by their terms, prevent the assigned income from
becoming community property, and therefore did not prevent it
from being taxable to the husband under the Robbins case. The
leading case on this question is Blair v. Roth,"3 involving an
agreement between husband and wife which provided in sub-
stance that the parties should contribute their earnings to a com-
mon fund which they should own equally. The Circuit Court of
Appeals, reversing the Board of Tax Appeals, 4 held that in spite
of the agreement the earnings 6f the wife remained community
property for tax purposes and should be taxed to the husband.
The court said that "at most, the agreement here was for an as-
signment by each of the parties of one-half of his or her earnings
to the other; that at the instant they were received, the salaries
were, by the law, impressed with the status of community prop-
erty, and were taxable with reference to that status; and that the
obligation to pay the tax, so computed could not be escaped by
contributing such incomes to the so-called partnerships between
the two members of the community, any more effectively than by
contributing it to a like enterprise as between one member of the
community and a third person." Under the law of California,
spouses have always had full power to change the status of their
property by agreement.3 6 Thus, in later cases the Roth decision
was interpreted to hold merely that under the terms of agreement
there in question, the wife's earnings remained community prop-
erty and therefore taxable to the husband, and consequently the
issue became largely a question of whether or not the spouses
specifically agreed that their income should be called "separate"
or "community." Their actual relation to, or rights in, the income
was of minor importance. Thus, when husband and wife agreed
that the income from their joint account should be divided be-
twveen them equally as their "separate property" and that the
earnings of each should be his or her "separate property" it was
nity property acquired in California prior to 1927 must be taxed to the
husband under the Robbins case, unless the spouses can accomplish a divi-
sion of the income by means of an assignment.
3322 F. (2d) 932 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927), cert. den., 277 U. S. 588, 48 Sup.
Ct. 436 (1928).
34 The Board rested its decision in Roth v. Commissioner, 4 B. T. A. 834
(1926), on the authority 'of Randall v. Commissioner, supra note 27, in
which it had held that the Robbins case had not passed on the question
of the taxation of the wife's earnings which should be taxed to the wife
in absence of any agreement. As to the Randall case the Circuit Court
said, supra note 32, at 933, "But inasmuch as appellee does not urge upon
us the reasoning of that decision, we need not discuss it; it is sufficient
to say that we deem it to be unsound."
-5 Supra note 33, at 934.
3r6 See COM MUNITY PROPERTY § 95, CAL. JURIS. SurP. (1930) at 135.
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held that no part of the wife's income under the agreement should
be taxed to the husband; 37 but when the parties agreed that their
property should be owned by them equally,:" or as joint tenants,2
it was held that the husband should be taxed for the wife's in-
come including her salary.
The courts continued to adhere to this theory until the United
States Supreme Court decided the case of Lucas v. Earl ° The
spouses had agreed in 1901 that all property which they owned
or thereafter acquired, including salaries, should be held by them
as joint tenants. The husband claimed that under this agree-
ment his salary for the years 1920-1921 should be taxed one-half
to him and one-half to his wife. Following the previous cases,
the Board of Tax Appeals and the Circuit Court decided the case
on the basis of whether or not the agreement converted the earn-
ings into "separate property," the Board holding that it did not-,'
and the Court that it did.- The Supreme Court, in one of Mr.
37Krull v. Commissioner, 10 B. T. A. 1096 (1928), acquiesced in by the
Commissioner, INT. Ruv. Cumt. BuLL. (1931) X-1, at 36. In the following
cases the Board held that the wife's earnings should not be taxed to the
husband because the parties had agreed that such earnings should be the
"separate property" of the wife: Gassner v. Commissioner, 4 B. T. A. 1071
(1926), acquiesced in by the Commissioner, INT. REv. Cum. BULL. (1931)
X-1, at 24; Busche v. Commissioner, 10 B. T. A. 1345 (1928), acquiesced
in, INT. REv. Cum. BuLL. (1931) X-1, at 10; Harris v. Commissioner, 10
B. T. A. 1374 (1928), acquiesced in, INT. REV. Cum. BULL. (1931) X-1, at
27. See Salomon v. Commissioner, 4 B. T. A. 1109 (1926), acquiesced in,
INT. RBv. Cums. BULL. (1931) X-1, at 57.
'1 Belcher v. Lucas, 39 F. (2d) 74 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930). Phillips, Stern-
hagen and Murdock, dissented from the decision of the Board of Tax
Appeals, 11 B. T. A. 1294 (1928), which was affirmed by the Circuit Court.
The ground of their dissent was that the agreement prevented the wife's
earnings from ever becoming community property.
- Richter v. Commissioner, 10 B. T. A. 1377 (1928). In Wehe v.
McLaughlin, 30 F. (2d) 217 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929), a husband tried to do
by agreement what the California Legislature accomplished by the 1927
amendment. He executed an instrument called a "waiver" in which he
stated that since there was doubt as to whether the wife had a "vested
right" in her half of the community property, he "waived" all rights in
the one-half of the property and declared "that said wife's share is vested
in her and hereby conveyed to her, and that I merely retain the right of
management and control thereof as provided in section 172, as her trustee."
The court held that all of his earnings should be taxed to him, saying, at
218: "Granting the competency of the parties, and assuming the delivery
of the instrument relied upon, we are of the opinion that it does not pur-
port to convert any part of appellant's future earnings into the separate
property of the wife." See also Brunton v. Commissioner, 15 B. T. A. 348
(1929).
40 281 U. S. 111, 50 Sup. Ct. 241 (1930).
41Earl v. Commissioner, 10 B. T. A. 723 (1928). The Board rested its
decision on Blair v. Roth, supra note 33.
42 Earl v. Commissioner, 30 F. (2d) 898 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929). The Court
distinguished Blair v. Roth, supra note 33, on the ground that in that case
there had been no agreement that the earnings should be joint property.
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Justice Holmes' characteristically concise opinions, swept the
husband's contention aside and rested its conclusion that he
should be taxed for the full amount of his salary upon a broad
interpretation of the Revenue Act. Referring to the argument
that Mr. Earl's salary became joint property upon the instant
that it was received, Justice Holmes said:
"We well might hesitate upon the latter proposition, because
however the matter might stand between husband and wife he
was the only party to the contracts by which the salary and fees
were earned, and it is somewhat hard to say that the last step
in the performance of those contracts could be taken by anyone
but himselfalone. But this case is not to be decided by attenuated
subtleties. It turns on the import and reasonable construction of
the taxing act. There is no doubt that the statute could tax sal-
aries to those who earned them and provide that the tax could
not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts how-
ever skillfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from
vesting even for a second in the man who earned it. That seems
to us the import of the statute before us and we think that no
distinction can be taken according to the motives leading to the
arrangement by which the fruits are attributed to a different
tree from that on which they grew." 43
The Justice made it perfectly plain that he was resting his
opinion on the broad proposition that the import of the Revenue
Act is to tax salary as a unit to the person who earns it 44 and
that he was not relying upon the technical theory that the instant
the salary was earned, title to it vested in the husband subject
to the assignment to the wife.45
This reasoning injected a new element into the taxation of
family income. Taken at its face value it indicated that salary
should be taxed to the spouse earning it, irrespective of any as-
signment and regardless of whether it was considered separate
or community income. The Board of Tax Appeals took this view
and held that it was not necessary to decide 'whether an agree-
ment between spouses living in California made the wife's salary
her separate property, or whether the salary was taxable to the
husband under the Robbins case,46 for in any event, it was tax-
43Supra note 40, at 114.
44Just how this "import" is found in the terms of the act is not so clear.
No tax is levied upon earnings and salary as such, and no distinction is
made between income derived from salaries and that from other sources.
See § 22 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1928.
4No attention was given to the possibility that the agreement might
have been invalid as an assignment of future earnings. See 1 WILLISTON
ON CONTRACTS (1920) § 414.
46Dohrmann v. Commissioner, 19 B. T. A. 466 (1930), followed in Dohr-
mann v. Commissioner, 19 B. T. A. 507 (1930), and Davis v. Commissioner,
20 B. T. A. 931 (1930). See also Davis v. Commissioner, 10 B. T. A. 1233
(1928).
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able to the wife who earned it.
But this doctrine had to be dealt with by Mr. Justice Roberts
in deciding Poe v. Seabonj.V7 It will be remembered that part of
the community income involved in that case consisted of Mr. Sea-
born's salary. If the import of the taxing act is to tax salary
to the person who earns it, how could the Court hold that one-
half of Mr. Seaborn's salary should be taxed to his wife? Mr.
Justice Roberts attempted to clear up this difficulty by saying:
"The very assignment in that case [Lucas v. Earl] was bottomed
on the fact that the earnings would be the husband's property
else there would have been nothing on which it could operate.
That case presents quite a different question from this, because
here, by law, the earnings are never the property of the husband,
but that of the community." -1 Thus, the argument based on a
technical theory of title, which was brushed aside by Mr. Justice
Holmes as an "attenuated subtlety," was made the basis of the
decision by Mr. Justice Roberts.
This interpretation of the Earl case has. led to further confu-
sion. Assume, for example, that in a community property state,
one spouse assigns or releases to the other his or her community
interest in the other's earnings. To whom should this interest
be taxed? Under the doctrine of the EarZl case, as stated by Mr.
Justice Holmes, the earnings would all be taxed to the spouse
earning them, who in this case would be the assigzee. But under
the theory of the Earl case, as interpreted by Mr. Justice Rob-
erts, the question arises as to whether the interest assigned
would not first vest in the assigiwr,4 which would make this
interest first the "property" of the spouse assigning it and there-
fore taxable to such spouse rather than to the assignee. In this
situation the Board of Tax Appeals has adopted the first theory
and held that the earnings assigned should be taxed to the as-
signee who earned them,r0 while the General Counsel of the
47 Suira note 13.
48 Id., at 117.
49Under Poe v. Seaborn, supra note 13, this community interest would,
in absence of agreement, be taxed to the spouse "owning" it.
r0This question was presented to the Board in -Roth v. Commissioner,
22 B. T. A. 587 (1931), which involved the same parties as Blair v. Roth,
supra note 33. After the decision in Blair v. Roth, Mr. and Mrs. Roth
entered into a written agreement specifically stating that any property they
owned or acquired should be "separate property" owned by them equally.
Armed with this agreement they appealed to the Board on the question as
to whether all of the wife's salary earned in 1923-1925 should be taxed to
the husband under the Robbins case, suipra note 9. The Board held that
one-half of the wife's earnings had been released to her and therefore never
became income to the husband. Murdock and Arundell dissented on the
ground that the wife's earnings must first have become community prop-
erty and therefore taxable to the husband. The Commissioner acquiesces
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Bureau of Internal Revenue has rendered an opinion to the effect
that the assigned earnings should be taxed to the assignor in
whom they first vested.- Both the Board and the General Coun-
sel rested their opinions in part on the authority of Lucas v. Earl.
The question must await clarification by the Supreme Court
unless the problem is eliminated by a change in the Revenue Act.
The agreements considered thus far have involved community
income, but spouses residing in non-community property states
have resorted to similar devices in order to accomplish assign-
ments of their income. In considering the effect of these arrange-
ments the Federal Courts and the Board of Tax Appeals have
usually relied upon property concepts for the basis of their deci-
sions, just as they have done in the community property cases,
with the result that the law is becoming embroiled in a mass of
technicality which bids fair to confuse completely the tax issues
involved. The doctrine has been propounded, and the courts quite
generally profess to follow it, that an assignment of future in-
come will not relieve the assignor from his tax liability unless
there is transferred an "existing property interest" in the source
from which the income is derived. In deciding what constitutes
an "existing property interest," and what amounts to a transfer
of such an interest, the courts have reached results which are
bewildering to those not conversant with legal niceties.
This can be illustrated by a few recent cases. In Hall v. Bur-
net, the petitioner was in the employ of an insurance company
and in 1905 entered into a contract with the company which
provided that he should be paid, in addition to his salary, a com-
mission on all renewal premiums received by the company for
insurance written during the life of the contract. Petitioner re-
mained in the employ of the company and in 1920 entered into
an agreement with his wife whereby he assigned to her an in-
terest in the commissions to the extent of a specified amount per
annum. The wife, in turn, agreed to surrender her inchoate
rights in her husband's property. The question was presented as
to whether the petitioner should be taxed for the portion of the
commissions paid the wife during the years 1921-1924. Since
the contract with the company expired in 1920, all the services
required of petitioner were performed prior to 1921. The Board
of Tax Appeals held that all of the commissions should be taxed
in the decision. INT. REV. CuIms. BULL. (1931) X-1, at 56. See also Roth v.
Commissioner, 17 B. T. A. 1330 (1929).
51 G. C. M. 9938, INT. REV..CUM'. BULl. (Dec. 7, 1931), X-49, at 2. The
case presented to the General Counsel was that of a husband and wife
residing in California who on August 1, 1927, entered into an agreement
that the salary of the husband should be his "separate property." The
General Counsel stated that this agreement would not prevent one-half of




to the petitioner on the ground that he attempted to assign
"future income" rather than an "existing property right." 2
Upon appeal this decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia. 3 - In attempting to distinguish the
case from Lucas v. Earrl 54 the court said, "In the view we take of
this case, [Hall case] what was assigned was neither income nor
earnings, but property. It was not an assignment of future earn-
ings but the transfer of a property right, and though this prop-
erty right gave rise to future income, uncertain and contingent
though it might be as to amount, that fact does not destroy the
distinction." 5
In the later case of Bishop v. Commissioner r1 which also in-
volved assignment of insurance commissions, the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit professed to follow the dis-
tinction made in the Hall case but reached just the opposite result
on the ground that there had been no assignment of a "present
property right." The feature of the case chiefly relied upon by
the court to distinguish it from Hall v. Burnet was the language
of the Tustrument by which the commissions were assigned. The
assignment provided that the commissions should not be payable
to the assignee "unless and until they become due and payable
to" the assignor under the terms of his contract with the insur-
ance company. The court said: "It is perfectly obvious from this
language that petitioner had no intention of conveying a prop-
erty right in praesenti, but only in future income as it might
52 Hall v. Commissioner, 17 B. T. A. 752 (1929). Green, Love and Smith
dissented on the ground that there had been an assignment of an interest
under an existing contract. In the dissent, at 756, it is said: "I cannot
doubt that if the respondent had contended that the amounts received under
the contract by petitioner's wife were taxable income to her, such conten-
tion would have to be sustained upon the authority of Irwin v. Gavit."
5Hall v. Burnet, 54 F. (2d) 443 (App. D. C. 1931), cert. den. 52 Sup.
Ct. 408 (1932).
54 Supra note 40.
-5 Supra note 53, at 444. In Nelson v. Ferguson, 56 F. (2d) 121 (C. C.
A. 3d, 1932), the court followed this reasoning. An employee had assigned
a patent to his employer in return for one-third of the profits which he
later assigned to his wife. Referring to the distinction between the assign-
ment of a "property right" and the assignment of "future earnings" the
court said: "This seems to be the central point of the Earl case not only
as expressed in the opinion in that case but as restated in Poe v. Seaborn.
There the assigned income sprang from services -which were not property
and which, of course, could not be assigned. Here the income sprang from
assigned property and if validly assigned, the income was that of the
assignee, the owner of the property, and was taxable as hers." Id, at 125.
For cases in which insurance commissions were taxed to the assignor, see
Stokes v. Commissioner, 22 B. T. A. 1386 (1931); Browne v. Commissioner,
3 B. T. A. 826 (1926).
56 54 F. (2d) 298 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931). The court affirmed the decision
of the Board of Tax Appeals which is reported in 19 B. T. A. 1108 (1930).
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become due to him." 51 It should be noted that the court does not
question the validity or enforceability of the assignment, but re-
fuses to recognize it for tax purposes solely because it does not
evidence an "intention" on the part of the assignor to transfer a
"'present property right." As an assignment of renewal commis-
sions the instrument was probably just as effective as the one
considered in thd earlier case, but in neither the Hall case nor
the Bishop case was the court concerned with the actual opera-
tion of the assignment.
This requirement that there must be a transfer of a "property
right" has led to unsubstantial distinctions and confusing re-
sults in other assignment cases. Thus, where a cestui assigned
to his wife a two-thirds interest in all income from a certain
trust "intending hereby to convey to and vest in" her an un-
divided two-thirds interest in such income, the court held that the
income should not be taxed to the assignor since the assignment
transferred a "present property interest" in the trust; 11 but
where the assignment provided that the trustees should pay over
5 Supra note 56, at 301.
r8 Where a lawyer assigned to his wife the right to forty per cent of his
compensation under a contingent fee contract) the Board held that the fees
should- be taxed to him on the authority of Lucas v. Earl, supra note 40,
althbugh there' was a dissent on the ground that a "property right" had
been assigned, Daugher y v. Commissioner, 24 B. T. A. 531 (1931). See
also, Stack v. Commissioner, 22 B. T. A. 707 (1931); Blumenthal v. Com-
missioner, 15 B. T. A. 1394 (1929). In Siegel v. Commissioner, 20 B. T. A.
563 (1930), income under an annuity contract was held taxable to the
assignee. The Commissioner does not acquiesce in the decision. INT. REV.
Cum.. BULL. (1931) X-1, at 93. There are a number of cases involving the
assignment of income from corporate stock. Cf. Bettendorf v. Commis-
sioner, 49 F. (2d) 173 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931); Le Blanc v. Commissioner,
7 B. T. A. 256 (1927). Seealso Smith v. Commissioner, 25 B. T. A. 291,
299 (1932) Warner v. Commissioner, 5 B. T. A. 963 (1926) ; Hoffmann v.
Commissioner, 3 B. T. A. 964 (1926). The last two cases are not acquiesced
in by the Commissioner. INT. REV. CuM. BULL. (1931) X-1, at 82, 95.
59 Commissioner -v. Field, 42 F. (2d) 820 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930), affirming
the.decision of the 'Boar'in Field v. Commissioner, 15 B. T. A. 718 (1929),
which is not aequisce, in by the Commissioner. INT. IEV. CumI. BULL.
(1931) X-1 at 79. From lie decision of the Board there was an interesting
dissent in,which. it was said (6. 727) "under varying states of fact the
principle has. been consistently recognized that by an assignment of future
income the assignor does not escape the tax. To say that such an assign-
ment is a transfpe of an inter:est in the fund is to override the principle
by casuistry". In the following cases trust income was not taxed to the
assignor o, the ,theory that there had been an assignment of an interest
in thetrust fund: O'Malley-Keyes v. Eaton, 24 F. (2d) 436 (D. C. Conn.
1928) i ,qng v. .Gnichtel, 28 F. (2d) 789 (D. N. J. 1928); Blaney v. Com-
misionel3 B. T; A. 1-315 (1928); Hubbell v. Commissioner, 14 B. T. A.
1040 (1929) ; Clark v. Commissioner, 16 B. T. A. 453 (1929) ; Blair v. Com-
nmissio er, 18 ,B. T. A. 69 (1929). The Commissioner acquiesces in the
Clark case but not in the Blaney or Blair cases. INT. REV CU . BULL.1
(1931)' X-1, at 13, 75.
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the income to the assignee as it became payable to the ccstui,
it was held that there was no transfer of the "property right
which produced the income" and therefore the assignor remained
liable for the tax.O The same theories are applied in the cases
involving the assignment of rents,"1 royalties,c2 and the proceeds
from the sale of real estate. 3 For example, in Leydig v. Com-
missioner,- the husband executed an assignment to his wife of
a one-half interest in all oil and gas royalty interests which had
been or should be received by him. The court held that the hus-
band should be taxed for one-half of the royalties received from
oil and gas leases executed before the assignment but should be
taxed for all the royalties from leases made after the assign-
ment. The reasoning of the court is that the assignment operated
to transfer the right to receive royalties under existing leases,
which was an "assignable property right," but did not have the
effect of transferring an interest in the oil and gas in place and
therefore only gave the wife the right to royalties from future
leases when the husband should receive them. If the court had
regarded unaccrued royalties as a species of incorporeal heredi-
tament and therefore a "present property right" which was
transferred by the assignment, the husband would have escaped
60 Porter v. United States, 52 F. (2d) 1056 (Ct. Cl. 1931). Cf. Shella-
barger v. Commissioner, 38 F. (2d) 566 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930), where the
court, reversing the Board, 14 B. T. A. 695, held that the income should
not be taxed to the assignor. The court said (p. 567): "The mere fact of
Maud's [assignor] receiving it does not indicate that it was her taxable
income. The statute does not impose an income tax upon everything which
is received by the taxpayer" and ". . . it is quite immaterial whether there
was employed language purporting to convey a half interest in the net
income, or agreeing to pay over the half as it was received-the result
is the same." Where the petitioner assigned a portion of her income under
a trust to her husband with the provision that if he should assign it, it
should revert to her, the Board held that she should be taxed for it. Power
v. Commissioner, 23 B. T. A. 428 (1931). See also, Welch v. Commissioner,
12 B. T. A. 800 (1928).
61 Bing v. Bowers, 22 F. (2d) 450 (S. D. N. Y. 1927), aff'd 2G F. (2d)
1017 (1928); Woods v. Commissioner, 5 B. T. A. 413 (1926); Ward v.
Commissioner, 22 B. T. A. 352 (1931).
62Infra note 64. See also Ferguson v. Commissioner 45 F. (2d) 573, 577
(C. C. A. 5th, 1930); McKee v. Alexander, 48 F. (2d) 838 (W. D. 01la.
1931); Walker v. Commissioner, 6 B. T. A. 1142 (1927); Browning v.
Commissioner, 16 B. T. A. 485 (1929).
63 Huntington v. Commissioner, 15 B. T. A. 851 (1929), not acquiesced
in by the Commissioner, INT. REv. Cum. BuLL. (1931) X-1, at 82; Bryan
v. Commissioner, 19 B. T. A. 111, 123 (1930). See also Liggett v. Com-
missioner, 5 B. T. A. 169 (1926); Eyestone v. Commissioner, 12 B. T. A.
1232 (1928); Rogers v. Commissioner, 15 B. T. A. 638 (1929).
"43 F. (2d) 494 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930), affirming the decision of the
Board, 15 B. T. A. 124 (1929). In the Board there was a dissent on the
ground that the assignment was merely an assignment of "future income"
as to both past and future leases.
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taxation for all of the wife's royalties.65
Numerous cases have come to the courts involving the assign-
ment of income from partnership enterprises and recently one
of these cases was decided by the Supreme Court. The important
facts were as follows: Leininger, who was the petitioner, and
M. G. Monaghan organized a partnership to engage in the laun-
dry business, each partner owning a one-half interest in the busi-
ness. In 1920 Leininger entered into a written agreement with
his wife to the effect that she was a full partner with him and
entitled to share equally the profits and losses. M. A. Monaghan,
who at that time represented the Monaghan interests, was noti-
fied of this agreement and apparently acquiesced. Mrs. Leininger
contributed no capital and took no part in the management of
the business. The question was presented as to whether Mr.
Leininger should be taxed for his wife's share of the profits.
The Board of Tax Appeals held that he should be, stressing
the facts that the wife contributed no capital; that the interest
stood in petitioner's name on the books; that the profits were
paid to the petitioner and were deposited by him in a joint
account, although his wife had a separate account; and that no
accounting was ever had between petitioner and his wife.0° This
decision was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit.6" The court had two arguments tb meet. First,
the usual one was advanced that this was an assignment of
"future income" which should not relieve the assignor from his
tax liability. In answering this argument the court used the
familiar doctrine of the assignment cases and said: "We cannot
regard this contract as a mere assignment of an interest in future
profits 'if, as and when' received. It creates mutual rights and
liabilities; it is irrevocable; it creates, at least as between the
parties, a vested interest in a property right; and the specified
profits and losses were hers, not his." O8 The second argument
was based on the section of the Revenue Act which provides:
"Individuals carrying on business in partnership shall be liable
for income tax only in their individual capacity. There shall be
included in computing the net income of each partner his dis-
tributive share, whether distributed or not, of the net income of
the partnership for the taxable year." 0 Following the reasoning
of an earlier case 10 the government contended that this section
prescribes a general policy for the taxation of partnerships and
that 'it provides that each partner shall be taxed for his full dis-
Or Phillips J., dissented from the decision of the court on this ground.
66 Leininger v. Commissioner, 19 B. T. A. 621 (1930).
67 Leininger v. Commissioner, 51 F. (2d) 7 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931).
68 Id., at 8.
69 This is section 181 of the Revenue Act of 1928. The provision has
been the same since the 1918 act.
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tributive share of the partnership profits irrespective of h.s
interest in such profits. Taking this interpretation of the Act,
the government argued that Mrs. Leininger was not a partner
and therefore all of the profits distributed to petitioner should
be taxed to hin. But the court rejected the government's con-
struction of the Act saying: "We do not see that section 218
(a) ,1 undertakes to fix any policy as to who is to be deemed to
receive the income; it merely extends the definition of individual
income so as to include undivided partnership profits." -2
The Supreme Court in Buinet v. Leininger 73 reversed the Cir-
cuit Court and affirmed the decision of the Board. The rationale
of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes was that the wife was not made a
partner and "upon the facts as found, the agreement with Mrs.
Leininger cannot be taken to have amounted to more than an
equitable assignment of one-half of what her husband should
receive from the partnership." 74 Apparently the Court accepted
the government's construction of the Act and made the question
turn upon whether Mrs. Leininger was made a partner or not.
The implication of the decision is that had she been made a part-
ner, her share of the profits could not have been taxed to her
husband. The effect of the decision, therefore, depends upon what
persons the Court will consider partners for tax purposes. The
Court said that Mrs. Leininger could not be regarded as a partner
since there was no finding that the other partners had consented
to her being made a member of the partnership. The fact that the
agreement between Leininger and his wife was communicated to
the other partners was not proof of their consent."5
The objection to this emphasis on membership in the firm lies
in the fact that Mrs. Leininger might have been included in the
partnership without any material change in her position. She
might have been made a member of the firm without being given
any share in the management of the business and without having
contributed either capital or services. In that event Mr. Lein-
70 Harris v. Commissioner, 39 F. (2d) 546 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
71 Revenue Act of 1918.
Y2Supra note 67, at 8. Commissioner v. Barnes, 30 F. (2d) 289 (C. C. A.
3d. 1929), is in accord with the court's decision.
73 52 Sup. Ct. 345 (1932).
74Id., at 346.
75 The fact that the other partners apparently acquiesced in the agree-
ment might have been made the basis of a finding that they consented to
Mrs. Leininger being made a partner.
7  In Hinshaw v. Commissioner, 16 B. T. A. 1236, 1239 (1929), where
petitioner's son was held to be a partner with petitioner although he con-
tributed no capital, the Board said: "As a matter of law it may be said
that regardless of the question as to whether or not the wife and son had
contributed any, or an equal part of the capital, the father then and there
had a legal and moral right to give to each such interest in the business
as he felt inclined to give them."
1§32] 1189
YALE LAW JOURNAL
inger would not have been taxed for his wife's sliare of the
profits if the reasoning of the court were followed, and that is
the result which the Board of Tax Appeals has reached. Although
in the Leininger case the Board reached the same conclusion that
the Supreme Court did,7' the Board has held in other cases that
when a man makes a member of his family a partner with him
in his business he should not be taxed for that person's share of
the profits, even when he retains the management of the business
and the other person has contributed neither capital nor labor.",
The reason given for this result is the interpretation of the part-
nership provision of the Act which the Supreme Court followed
in the Leininger case." Thus the organization of the family part-
77 Supra note 66. In Battleson v. Commissioner, 22 B. T. A. 455 (1931),
a husband assigned his interest in a partnership to his wife but did not
make her a partner. The Board held that although the wife owned part of
the partnership property -and although she would have a right to an ac-
counting from her husband, the income from the partnership was part of
his distributive share and should be taxed to him. Love, Trussell and
Matthews dissented, arguing that the wife "owned" the income and that
the Sixteenth Amendment does not authorize "the taxing of one person on
another's income'"; neither does the statute require that such be done. It
was stated that the word "partner" in the partnership provision is used
as synonymous with "owner."
78 In the following cases the Board has held that a partnership was cre-
ated and that each partner should be taxed for his distributive share of
the partnership profits: Reeb v. Commissioner, 8 B. T. A. 759 (1927), where
petitioner retained in himself the power of management and control over
the business and assigned a part interest to his wife as trustee for their
minor child. The Commissioner does not acquiesce in this decision. INT.
REv. Cum. BULL. (1931) X-1, at 90. Wilson v. Commissioner, 11 B. T. A.
963 (1928), not acquiesced in by the Commissioner, INT. REV. CUM. BULL.
(1931) X-1 at 96, where petitioners made their wives partners, although
the latter contributed neither capital nor services, were unfamiliar with
the business, and took no active part in its management. Phelps v. Com-
missioner, 13 B. T. A. 1248 (1928), acquiesced in by the Commissioner, INT.
REv. Cu . BULL. (1931) X-1, at 51, where the agreement between peti-
tioner and his wife was oral and the wife contributed neither capital nor
services, and where it appeared that the arrangement was entered into
for the purpose of reducing taxes. Olds v. Commissioner, 15 B. T. A. 560
(1929), not acquiesced in by the Commissioner, INT. REV. CUm. BULL,
(1931) X-1, at 88, where petitioner made his daughters partners with him
but retained control of the business, and where it was provided that the
daughters might draw out profits only in such amounts as the petitioner
saw fit to pay them. Accord generally: Loper v. Commissioner, 12 B. T. A.
164 (1928); Harrington v. Commissioner, 21 B. T. A. 260 (1930); Oakley
v. Commissioner, 24 B. T. A. 1082 (1931). In Tally v. Commissioner, 22
B. T. A. 712 (1931), it was held that no partnership existed where peti-
tioner, his wife, and son provided in the purported partnership agreement
that the petitioner should be "absolute dictator as to the methods and poli-
cies to be pursued in the management thereof, particularly including the
manner, method, and amount of all expenditures, and division of all profits."
See also Felton v. Commissioner, 18 B. T. A. 64 (1929); I(asch v. Com-
missioner, 25 B. T. A. 284 (1932).
79If the interpretation which the Supreme Court places upon the part-
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nership remains as a method of accomplishing an assignment of
income which will be effective for the purpose of reducing the
tax burden.
This review of the cases involving the taxation of assigned
income indicates that the courts have not generally followed a
consistent tax policy, but have reached their decisions by apply-
ing theories of property or partnership which have led to con-
fusing results. The tax falls sometimes upon the assignor and at
other times upon the assignee, depending upon whether the
assignment transfers a "present property right" in the source
of the income or whether the assignee is made a partner in the
business from which the income is derived. It is extremely un-
likely that the courts can extricate themselves from the difficul-
ties of this situation without some change in the Revenue Act.
III. Taxation of the Family as a Unit
A change in the Revenue Act which would provide for the taxa-
tion of the family as a unit would eliminate the discrimination
resulting from the community property decisions and would at
the same time destroy most of the difficulties arising from the
assignment cases. A simple method of accomplishing this result
would be the adoption of a provision to the effect that in comput-
nership provision of the Revenue Act is followed, and it is held that each
partner shall be taxed on his distributive share of the partnership profits,
difficult questions arise as to what constitutes a partnership and what the
term "distributive share" means. See Copland v. Commissioner, 41 F. (2d)
501 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930), where it was held that the business constituted
a "joint adventure" and not a partnership, and therefore assigned income
should not be taxed to the assignor. Cf. Osborn v. Commissioner, 22 B. T.
A. 935 (1931), where the Board held that the assignees, who had contrib-
uted neither capital nor services, were not members of the "joint adven-
ture," and that the income paid to them should be taxed to the assignor. See
also Bowers v. New York Trust Co., 9 F. (2d) 548 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925);
Ruprecht v. Commissioner, 39 F. (2d) 458 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930); Hellman
v. United States, 44 F. (2d) 83, 90 (Ct. Cls. 1930). Cases have arisen
where the courts and Board have held that a partner should not be taxed
for his full distributive share of the partnership profits. See Rucker v.
Blair, 32 F. (2d) 222 (C. C. A. 9th4 1929), where it was held that the
partnership profits were community income and should be taxed one-half
to the husband who was a member of the partnership, and one-half to the
wife who was not a partner. Cf. Larson v. Burnet, 50 F. (2d) 308 (App.
D. C. 1931). See also Pugh v. United States, 48 F. (2d) 600 (S. D.
W. Va., 1931), and Biggs v. Commissioner, 15 B. T. A. 1092 (1929), where
the state law governing the partnership provided that the wife could not
be a partner with her husband. In cases where a partnership interest is
held in trust it has been held that the trustee-partner should not be taxed
for his distributive share of the partnership profits. Cohen v. Commis-
sioner, 31 F. (2d) 874 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929); Hallahan v. Commissioner,
14 B. T. A. 584 (1928); Hamerslag v. Commissioner, 15 B. T. A 90 (1929).
Cf. Luce v. Burnet, 55 F. (2d) 751 (App. D. C. 1932).
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ig the taxes payable by husband and wife living together the tax
should be based on their combined income and should be borne by
each spouse in the proportion which his or her income bears to
the combined income; or the provision might read that the rate
to be used in computing the tax of each spouse should be that
applicable to their combined income. Thus, if A and B were liv-
ing together as husband and wife and each received a taxable net
income of $4000, each would be compelled to pay one-half of the
tax due on a net income of $8000; each spouse would be taxed
in proportion to his or her income, but at the rate applicable to
their combined income. The combined tax due from husband and
wife would not be altered by any change in the distribution of
the income between them, nor would it be affected by the fact
that part or all of the income was community property. If it
were thought desirable to make the provision more inclusive, it
might be provided that the income of unemancipated minor chil-
dren should be added to the income of their parents, and the rate
applicable to this total combined income should be used in com-
puting the tax payable by the parents and by the children. If
the burden thus placed upon family incomes proved to be too
heavy, a larger exemption might be permitted married persons.
One of the first problems to be faced in considering such a
change in the law would be its constitutionality. Under the pro-
posed statute a husband or wife whose spouse had a separate
income' would be taxed individually at a higher rate than a hus-
band or wife whose spouse had no separate income. Thus A with
an income of $4000, whose wife also had an income of $4000,
would be compelled to pay a larger tax than if his wife had no
income. The constitutional objection urged against such a sys-
tem of taxation would be that it results in an unreasonable dis-
crimination against spouses with separate incomes. However,
such a contention is, not sound. The family is an economic unit,
at least in the vast majority of cases, and the husband whose
wife has a separate income is subjected to a lighter financial bur-
den than one whose wife is entirely dependent upon his income.
The income of either spouse is usually available to meet family
expenses, and as far as the actual enjoyment of it is concerned
it makes little difference which spouse owns it. Ordinarily the
only exception to this would arise in the case of husband and
wife who were separated, but such persons need not come within
the terms of the act, since it might apply only to spouses living
together as members of a family.
The only case which has immediate bearing on the constitu-
tional question presented is Hoeper v. Tax Commission 0 recently
decided by the Supreme Court. The case involved the validity of
80 52 Sup. Ct. 120 (1931).
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certain sections of the Wisconsin income tax law which provided
that the husband should be taxed for the total combined income
received by him and his wife and each child under eighteen
years of age. There had been assessed against the husband a
tax computed on the basis of his income combined with that of
his wife which was derived from separate property which she
had owned prior to her marriage. The Court held, Justices
Holmes, Brandeis and Stone dissenting, that the tax was uncon-
stitutional on the ground that it was a violation of the due process
clause to tax the husband for income which was his wife's sepa-
rate property and over which she had complete control. The
Court said: "We have no doubt that, because of the fundamental
conceptions which underlie our system, any attempt by a state
to measure the tax on one person's property or income by refer-
ence to the property or income of another is contrary to due
process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
That which is not in fact the tax-payer's income cannot be made
such by calling it income." SI This statement taken alone would
seem to raise serious doubt as to the validity of the proposed
tax but it must be considered in connection with the case decided.
As applied in the Hoeper case the Wisconsin law imposed upon
the husband the whole tax for the combined income; it did not
apportion the tax between the spouses. The appellant made this
clear in the opening statement of his brief, which reads:
"Whether the two statutes might have been construed as together
authorizing only a collection from each spouse of that one's pro-
portionate share of the tax is not involved." C2 Therefore, the
Court did not pass on the question presented by the proposed
provision. It treated the problem before it as being merely that
of taxing one person for another's income and although this ap-
proach avoided the real issues involved,s3 it was a view which the
Court could logically take since the whole tax was imposed on the
husband." In considering the tax imposed under the suggested
statute, a different issue would be presented since each spouse
would pay only his or her proportion of the total tax. The prob-
lem raised would have to be" considered as one of classification and
as pointed out above there is good reason for taxing spouses with
82 Id., at 122.
8 Brief for Appellant, p. 5.
,3 As pointed out above, the family is an economic unit and the husband
does derive substantial benefit from the separate income of his wife. There-
fore to tax him for his wife's income is not the same as to tax him for the
income of a stranger.
- In Burk-Waggoner Ass'n v. Hopkins, 269 U. S. 110, 46 Sup. Ct. 48
(1925), it was held that an association might be taxed as a corporation
although it was a partnership by the state law under which it was organ-
ized. In that case the court found sufficient reason for taxing the income
to an entity which did not technically "own" it under the state law.
1932] 119111
YALE LAW JOURNAL
separate incomes at higher rates. Consequently the Hoeper deci-
sion would not be authority for holding the proposed tax uncon-
stitutional.
Even though there be doubts as to the validity of the proposed
statute, it is submitted that the present situation regarding the
taxation of family income makes the experiment desirable. Some
means should be found for eliminating the discrimination result-
ing from Poe v. Seaborn against families residing in non-com-
munity property states. When the Revenue Acts of 1921 and
1924 were being drafted, it was proposed that there should be
included in them a provision for the taxation of community
income to the spouse who had the right of management and con-
trol.5 These proposals were defeated, possibly because there was
some fear that they would throw the balance in favor of the
non-community property states. This objection could not pos-
sibly be made to the tax suggested. It would establish a uniform
national system for the taxation of family income and would
destroy many of the difficulties now arising from the assignment
of income from one member of the family to another.
85 See REPORT OF THE COMMsi IITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS OP TIE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPORT No. 350, 67th Congress, First Session, p. 11,
and CONFERENCE REPORT No. 486 of the same Congress, p. 21; HEAtINS
BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
68th Congress, First Session, Revenue Revision, pp. 194, 348, 349, 315,
478, 482.
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